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The life of the "business corporation in theory is perpetual Man.,
on the other hand, is "horn in the shadow of the grave." Certainty of his
life span is unknown, but certainty that it is a span and not perpetuity is
known. Man has only so many years of economic productivity in which to make
his financial mistakes, learn his lessons, and then to postulate and carry
out what will hopefully he a rational approach to his future economic well-
being. The corporation, in theory, can make its mistakes, learn its lessons,
plan for future years, and then engage in the same cycle ad infinitum.
From the standpoint of time, the burden of proper financial manage-
ment is more on man and his personal finances than it is on man and corporate
finances
.
The stock market has an understandable allure for the man who de-
sires to funnel his productive years' income into investments promising
future financial security. Funds invested in stocks possess liquidity (ex-
cept, perhaps, some unlisted stocks), offer a potential for capital gain or
dividend income, or both, permit the investor to know, almost to the penny,
the exact value of his investments at any time and, if the investor is suc-
cessful, provide a hedge against inflation. But all these benefits are
counterbalanced by the risks inherent in stock ownership. The investor may
well find that his investments are providing a flow of funds, as he hoped,
but in the wrong direction.

!Ehe field of literature is not remiss in providing man with an
abundance of printed matter designed to ease his way quickly into the
mysteries of the stock market. The usual treatise on the stock market is
largely concerned with either the mechanics of the market, methods of
"making money" on the market, defining investor objectives, presenting in-
vestment plans, discussing the principles of stock investing, or combina-
tions of any of these.
These approaches are roughly analogous to the man who is taught
the formula for computing the current ratio of corporations, but has not
been taught nor does he understand why the "things" classified as assets
and liabilities mean different things to different concerns and are valued
differently by different concerns. In short, he understands and has memor-
ized the formula but he does not know what the formula means.
Investors live in a world of words peculiar to the stock market and,
although most of them understand these words and how and when to use them,
their glibness does not bring about knowledge of how these seemingly inno-
cent words affect them and what they do in the market.
It is my thesis that semantics, and particularly the general se-
mantics of Korzybski, provides a "way of thinking" about the stock market
which is basic to success in the market. I do not believe that everyone
who is successful in the market has consciously thought about or conscious-
ly applied this semantic approach or that they even know what semantics
and general semantics are; but I do believe that truly successful stock
investors have either consciously or intuitively applied this way of
thinking.

Two examples of this applied way of thinking are found in Bernard
Baruch's Autobiography and G. M. Loeb's, The Battle for Investment Sur-
2
rival . Although neither of these highly successful investors usee the word
"semantics" in any of its forms or derivations, both their books indicate
an intuitive, if not conscious, semantical approach to investing.
It is not contended that knowledge and understanding of the seman-
tics of the stock market will necessarily make the unsuccessful stock in-
vestor a successful investor. If this were actually the case, the writer
would be too busy with his investments to write this paper. However this
approach will provide the basis for a more rational approach to the stock
market than is otherwise possible.
The problems of the stock investor are numerous. From the stand-
point of semantics, particularly general semantics, the writer contends
that the major problems are five:
1. Understanding the symbology of the market.
2. Etaotional reactions to words such as speculator
and technician.
3. Obtaining and understanding market information.
k. Recognizing the nature of forecasts and their
limitations
•
5. Assessing success in the stock market.
Bernard M. Baruch, Barueh; My Own Story (Hew York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1957).
Gerald M. Loeb, The Battle for Investment Survival (New York:
Hurry House Publishers, 1953)*

It is to these five problem areas that this paper is addressed.




THE SmBOUSM OP THE STOCK MARKET
. . . the patriotic archbishop of Cantebury, found it
advisable ,ff
"Found -what? M said the Duck.
"Foun* it, " the Mouse replied, rather crossly:
"of course you- know what »it» means."
"I know what 'it' means well enough, when I find a
thing," said the Duck: "it's generally a frog7 or a
worm. ul
—Lewis Carroll
What Is the Stock Market?
The stock market is an inimitable place. It does not recognize dif-
ferences of age, color, race, or creed. It does not care if one is an
atheist, a left-winger, or a right-winger. Whether illiterate, a do-gooder,
a no-gooder, a symbol of virtue or dissipation—the market will welcome all
with open arms. The stock market, in short, personifies the democratic
process *
But what is the stock market?
2
Dice and Eiteman, in their definitive book, The Stock Market, de-
voted kkj pages to the stock market without defining the term "stock market"
in their text. Their preface, however, defined the "stock market" as an
Alice in Wonderland *
2 /
Charles A. Dice and Wilford J. Eiteman, The Stock Market (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952).

institution that:
. . • has been developed to make the ownership of stocks
safer and more convenient and to put the business of invest-
ment on a higher plane of intelligence and honesty. 3
This is a strangely antiseptic definition, completely devoid of the
dynamics of the human beings who buy and sell stocks and provide the services
that make the "market." Shis definition ignores the emotions, rumors, specu-
lation and dramatic price movements common to the buying and selling of
stocks, and certainly is not descriptive of what the gallery visitor to the
Hew York Stock Exchange observes on the floor below him.
But these objections to the stated definition are personal and re-
flect the inadequacy of a definition-description to agree with one's mental
picture of the "stock market." To the writer, the "stock market" is the
broker, the bookkeeper, the floor trader, the specialist, the investor, Wall
Street, the over-the-counter dealer. It is all of these things and more.
It is the analyst, the advisory letter writer, the sophisticate who pur-
chased eight shares of stock in 1951 and brags that he "has never lost money
in the market." Die "market" includes the rationale of the investor who
watches the market price of his stock drop $25 a share in five months and
consoles himself with the thought that, after all, it is a quality stock
and besides, look at the $3.60 annual dividend it pays.
Although this mental concept of the "stock market" may be adequate
for the writer's purposes, it may not be so for others. Perhaps to the
janitor the "stock market" represents the littered trading floor of the Mew
York Stock Exchange; to the broker's bookkeeper it is "that place" where, if
^3»id., p. v.

7the volume of trading gets too high, "they" make him stay after five o'clock
to close out the accounts ; to the lithographer It Is that place vhere new-
issues of stock mean nev 'business printing stock certificates.
To Bernard Baruch, the "stock market" takes the form of a "total
barometer for our civilization" as the prices of stocks "are affected by
J*literally anything and everything that happens in our world* Jacob Kamm
looks upon the "stock market" as some form of an Ail-American hobby shop:
Every American ought to take advantage of this oppor-
tunity of stock ownership. It can be not only a pleasant
eaqperience but also a profitable hobby. 5
But to G. M. Loeb the "stock market" must be an arena* as Inferred from
the title of his book, The Battle For Investment Survival .
Who is right? And by what standard do we determine "right"? Bie
use of a dictionary to settle our problem is of limited value because the
writing of a dictionary
... is not a task of setting up authoritative state-
ments about the "true meanings" of words, but a ti.sk of re-
cording , to the best of one's ability, what various words
have meant to the authors in the distant or Immediate past,.
Pie writer of a dictionary is a historian, not a lawgiver .
We cannot find the "stock market" to photograph it, or to point to it, in
the hope of identifying it to the degree that we can say what it "is."
Baruch, p. 81+.
•Jacob 0. Kamm, Making Profits in the Stock Market (Hew York: One
World Publishing Company, 1952), p. 152.
c
Samuel I. Hayakawa, Tanguage in Thought and Action (Hew York:
Earcourt, Brace and Company, 19^9), P» 55»

8At this point in our search for a definition of the "stock market",
however, ve can identify three "things":
1. The term "stock market."
2. The undefined reality of what the "stock market" is.
3* The mental concept of what the term "stock market"
means to various individuals.
We can also define the relationship that exists between these three "things":
The "stock market" is a term which stands for, or repre-
sents, the mental concepts of what each user of the term con-
ceives the reality of the "stock market" to be.
Thus, the term "stock market" is a symbol. It is a symbol of reality
as that reality appears to each user of the term "stock market."'
The words "stock market" mean nothing by themselves; only at such a
time as when they are used together do they stand for anything; only at that
time do they have meaning. And the only meaning the symbol "stock market"
9
can have is the meaning attached to it by the mind of the user. Therefore,
the only direct relationship that exists between symbol, mental concept, and
reality, is that between symbol and mental concept—for symbols provide the
means for communicating thoughts about reality and not reality itself.
'Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity (3d ed.j Lakeville, Conn.:
The International Bon-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, 19^ ), pp.
76-84; also see Hayakawa, pp. 2^-28.
8
Charles K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (8th
ed.; Hew York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 19W), pp. 9-10*
^Prank Hesbit, language, Meaning and Reality (Hew York: Exposition
Press, Inc., 1955)* P« I65T
Ogden and Richards, p. 9.

Each individual using a symbol is uniquely free "to manufacture and
manipulate and assign values" to the symbol as he pleases. Whether or not
the values assigned to the symbol "stock market" are adequate depends solely
upon the purpose for which the symbol "stock market" is used and not on the
intrinsic worth of the "values" themselves. 2hus, if the Stock Exchange
janitor's view that the "stock market" is "the littered floor of the Sew York
Stock Exchange" is adequate for his purposes, then his meaning assigned to
the symbol "stock market" is as valid as that assigned "by Baruch.
dus, all the different meanings of "stock market" as discussed are
correct to the degree that they adequately reflect the individual's concept
of reality. But conflict between different meanings and the individuals us-
ing these meanings is inevitable when the symbol is identified as the thing
symbolized. In other words, when individuals fail to recognize the symbolic
process, when they think that their meaning is the only "correct" meaning, the
resultant can range from semantic arguments to war.
We can never know all there is to know about any "reality," that is,
13
it is impossible to know everything about anything. "Therefore, if all the
different meanings of the "stock market" were added together, we would still
know only a fraction of the total of the reality of the "stock market." In
short, we can never fully define "stock market." If man contends that he
Tiayakawa, p. 25.
12.
Charles W. Morris, Signs, language, and Behavior (Hew York: George
Braziller, Inc., 1955) , p. 93*
^Cassius J. Keyser, Mole Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: E. P.
Dutton & Co., 1927), p. 132; H. A. Overstreet, The Mature Mind (Hew York:
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 19^9), p. k6} Sidney Ratner, "Presupposition
and Objectivity in History," Philosophy of Science , October, 19**0, p. 50^ j and
George Santayana, Obiter Scripta (Haw York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 193&)>
ed. Justus Buchler~and Benjamin Schwartz, p. 132.
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has folly defined nstock market," or any other term, then, according to
Kayser:
. . . either he is a performer of logical miracles or
he is an assi and, as you know, logical miracles are
impossible.1^"
Even if ve assume that man can perform logical miracles, that which ve did
know at any one moment of time would not be the same at the next moment be-
cause reality would have changed and our "dated" description of reality
would no longer be accurate. Heraclitus, the Greek, contended, that it was
impossible to step in the same river twice. In the same way of thinking,
it is impossible to say what the "stock market" is, as it is not the static
object inferred from Dice and Elteman's definition, but rather it is a
dynamic process.
The Investor and the Symbol
To the investor, what merit is there in knowing that the "stock
market" is a symbol? Perhaps of greatest importance is the realization that
in using the symbol, or any other of the symbols of the stock market, we are
not talking about reality* This knowledge permits the investor to assess
statements about the stock market as generalizations and as unreal, imper-
fect statements. For example, when a market commentator [Imaginary] says:
"The stock market staged an advance accompanied by heavy volume," we know
that some stocks dropped in price, some stocks were not traded that period,
and the trading volume on some stocks probably decreased. We know that what
the commentator was actually saying was something like this:
Cassius J. Keyser, Mathematical Philosophy (Hew York: E. P.
Dutton, 1922), P. 152.

uOne or more of the 30 stocks comprising the Dow-Jones Indus-
trial Average advanced sufficiently in price to offset the market
price movement of the remaining stocks comprising this Index so
the net result was a higher Daw-Jones Industrial Average than tor
the previous day* Ctoirici&entally, the volume of the day's trading;
in all of the stocks listed on the Hew York Stock Kxchange vas
heavy in the sense that the amber of shares traded vas greater
-than the number of shares traded on the previous day.
With this look at reality, we would not be surprised or confused to
note that the Standard & Poor's Index dropped, that only one of the 30 stocks
used in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average advanced, that the other 29 stocks
in this Tnflir*; closed at or below their previous closing price, and that the
increase in trading volume was due to increased activity in stocks other
than those included in the Dow-Jones Industrials. We also know that nothing
has been said about the stocks traded on the other 16 stock f"crt*ftflifflt*' in the
United States, the stocks traded on the over-the-counter narket, or stocks
traded on the foreign exchanges. In short, we have not nade the mistake of
We further know that the symbol "stock market" is not what we buy
when we buy stock. She symbol "stock market" as represented by the averages
or Indexes may go up, down, or hold relatively steady. But our stock, which
is not the symbol, may either move contrary to the "market," with the
"market," or not move at all.
The Abstraction of the Stock Market
In symbolisatlon there is a relationship between (l) the mind,
which we have already discovered attaches manning to that which acts as a
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symbol; (2) the symbol itself; and, (3) the process, thing, or object,
15
called "reality" or referent, meant by the symbol.
Thus far the "stock market," as a symbol, has been "lifted out" of
the total complex of our social structure and considered as an entity inde-
pendent of other social activity. In actuality, the referent,, "stock
market," is but one aspect of social activity and cannot exist as a separate
entity but only as an interrelated and interconnected part of the whole of
society. But, if ve are to avoid hopeless confusion, ve find this "lifting
out," or abstracting, of the "stock market" from the whole of its environ-
ment is a necessity. Although it is the nature of our thinking process, and
a function of symbolization, to abstract a part from the whole, what we must
recognize, as previously pointed out, is that the symbol is not that which
16
is symbolized.
Each individual user of the symbol "stock market 11 ascribes certain
characteristics of his knowledge of the reality of the "stock market" to
the symbol "stock market." The characteristics that are ascribed by some
process of "knowing," "feeling," or "interest," etc., are those which are
useful or meaningful to the individual; they do not, and cannot, include all
17
of the characteristics of the reality of the "stock market." The symbol,
"stock market," is recognized as an abstraction, and as such it is not the




This act of abstracting is an indispensable convenience for com-









«HTri »qp rather than on tits basis of general teams [symbols] at higher
levels of abstraction, our everyday vorld would become too complicated,
verbally, to permit other than the accrwg>1 1 shmeirt of the most rudimentary
vrocessas.
The freedom ve have to abstract our symbol contexts in a manner most
meaningful to us is the same freedom others possess to abstract their own
meaningful symbol contexts. Bach individual, then, builds his own framework
of reference which has an existence apart from the frameworks of other
persons. When we communicate, we share our frameworks of reference. But ve
should feel some constraint in our communication process when we realise the
differences that exist between our individual frameworks of reference. For
«19
in the world . . . "^
This failure to recognise that each individual has his own framework
of reference leads to difficulty and, in some cases, to highly emotional re-
actions to symbols. It is perfectly normal for humans to conclude, upon
reading or hearing a cowounication, that the speaker or writer is referring
20
to what they would be referring to if the positions were reversed* But
this conclusion is rarely Justified, as no two individuals have Identical
experiences in life from which to build their contexts.
The words "speculator" and "investor'' provide us with perfect exaimyief
of confusion between different frameworks of reference and the emotional re-
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^Hugh R. Walpole, Semantics (Hew York: Bforton & Co., Inc., 19*H),
p. XXk*
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When as a young and unknown man I started to be success-
ful, I vas referred to as a gambler. My operations increased
in scope and volume. Then I vas known as a speculator. The
sphere of my activities continued to expand and presently I
was known as a banker. Actually I had been doing the same
thing all the time. 1
—Sir Ernest Cassell
The word "investor" was used in chapter I in its broad, all-inclusive
sense. That is, an investor is one who makes investments. To define
"investor," then, we must first have an acceptable definition of
"investment."
To Clendenin, an investment "is any asset or property right acquired
«2
or held for the purpose of conserving capital or earning an income.
Dowrie and Puller were more optimistic in their definition of an investment
in that they were not concerned with the minimum aim of preserving capital.
To them an Investment "may be defined broadly as the employment of capital
with the aim of producing a gain in the shape of income or appreciation in
3
value or both ..." A synthesis of these two definitions would be:
Attributed to Sir Ernest Cassell, the private banker to King Edward
VII; quoted from Baruch, p. 2Vf.
o
John C. Clendenin, Introduction to Investments (3d ed.; New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., I960), p. 2.
-^George W. Dowrie and Douglas R. Fuller, Investments (2d ed.;




An investment is the employment of capital for the purpose
of preserving capital., earning an income, or gaining capital
appreciation.
It is the writer's opinion that the act of preserving one's capital is quite
an accomplishment, in periods of dollar depreciation, and, therefore worthy
of heing included as an aim in an investment program.
With this definition of Investments, the investor has a wide range
of opportunities for employment of his capital. Savings accounts, life
k 5
insurance, real estate, business equities, corporate stocks, bonds,
mortgages, etc., are all investments within the meaning of the definition.
However, when the word "investor" is applied exclusively to the pur-
chase and sale of stocks, it is common to find that "investor" assumes a
connotation different from that of "investor" in the broad, generic sense.
This change in sense or meaning, according to the use of the word, is a
common event in the English language. The normality of such a change is
well stated by Welby: "There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the
sense of a word, but only the sense in which it is used."
When an individual, seeking an opportunity for capital investment,
enters the world of the stock market, he finds that he cannot be "Just" an
investor in the general sense of the word. He must classify himself or be
classified as either an investor or a speculator. He cannot be both, nor








an Investor or a speculator. On the one hand he is told that the only safe
approach to stock investing is that of the speculator, while on the other
hand he is told that "extensive speculation is not profitable*' As the in-
dividual reads more of the literature, he finds sources stating that only
investors invest in investments and that there is something good and sound
about this type of individual and his method of operations in the stock
10
market. In contrast, the speculator speculates in speculations and this
connotes a parasitical activity which is morally wrong.
Why is it that an individual must be either an investor or a specu-
lator, and why is the investor "good" and the speculator "bad"? To answer
the former, the clock will have to be turned back 23 centuries; for the
latter, we shall have to invade the world of the "pooh-poohians .
"
In spite of the dangers of definition, what differentiates the in-
vestor from the speculator? Since a speculator engages in making specula-
tions and an investor in making investments, the point of differentiation
must be that between speculation and investment. A succinct expression of
this difference was given by Dowrie and Fuller in Investments;
In popular usage, the extent to which a security operation
is held to be a speculation and not an investment depends pri-
marily on the degree of risk which is believed to have been
assumed . . . •
7
'Roger BridweU, "Investor or Speculator? Line Between the Two Must





Lewis D. Gilbert, Dividends and Democracy (Iarchmont, Mew York:
American Research Council, 1956J, p. 72.




By restricting the definition to popular usage, a speculator can
be said to be one who knowlingly assumes a high degree of risk in his
selection of stock, while an investor is one who selects stock on the basis
of assuming minimum risk.
Die Either-Or Dichotomy
Some 2300 years ago, Aristotle advanced what to him were the three
basic laws of thought of the people of his time. These were the laws of iden-
tity, of the excluded middle, and of non-contradiction. Expressed in other
terms, his laws can be stated as:
A is A.
Everything must be A or non-A.
nothing can be both A and non-A.
These generalizations of Aristotle were accepted by his followers as
laws of nature and, as such, not subject to revision. In short, his laws
were taken as Truth in an A is A sense. Since they were Truth, any modifi-
cations of these laws would be non-Truths. Consequently, these laws were
13
continued by the time-binding process of man as a system of doctrine and
as a social structure. This Aristotelian system and social structure foster-
ed a two-valued structure of orientation, i.e., an either-or dichotomy.
Something is either true or false, right or wrong, black or white; there is
Ik
no in-between, no shade of gray. As John Dewey put it:
13
The process of passing thought, information, and knowledge from one
generation to another. See Alfred Korzybskl, Manhood of Humanity (New York:
E. P. Dutton & Company, 1921), pp. 59-60.




Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It
Is given to formulating its "beliefs in terms of Either-Ors .
between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities.^
Not only is the two-valued structure of our thinking process firmly
rooted in our culture, but our acceptance and continued use of this way of
thinking is further strengthened by what Harry and Bonaro Overstreet stated
is our "tendency to oversimplify problems and to demand that others over-
simplify them." Oversimplification, according to the Overstreets, expresses
itself,
... as a kind of debate-minded tendency to think of prob-
lems as two-sided rather than many-sided, so that we ask people
to choose sides rather than explore possibilities; . . . .*•
The Aristotelian either-or dichotomy produces the following "laws"
when applied to the investor-speculator in the stock market:
Law of identity;
A speculator is a speculator.
or
An investor is an Investor.
Law of the excluded middle t
All buyers and sellers of stock must be
either a speculator or an investor.
Law of non-contradiction:
Ho buyer and seller of stock can be both
a speculator and an investor.
^John Bew*y, Experience and Education (Hew York: The Macmillan
Company, 1938)/ P« 1«
Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, The Mind Alive (Hew York: W. W.





Should the proper approach to stock market operations be two-valued In
keeping with these laws, we suffer no disillusionment with our cultural
hackground in that we do not have to invalidate the ancient laws of
Aristotle, nor do we have to cease in our application of the simplest two-
sided approach to our investment problems. But if the approach to investing
(in its general sense) is many-sided then we must discard the structure of
the Aristotelian system and redirect our approach to the investment prob-
lem from that of the oversimplified two-sided approach to the complex
approach of including the "excluded middle." Hot to do so would make our
approach to the stock market hopeless, because "ve cannot hope to grasp a
„18
multivalued event with a two-valued tool.
This discussion logically leads us to consider some objections to
the either-or dichotomy of the Aristotelian system. But before departing
this section, we must acknowledge that the division of general investors
into the either-or world of investor-speculator has its roots firmly im-
bedded in our cultural background; it did not "Just happen." We must also
recognize that acceptance of this two-sided orientation has been further
enhanced, as pointed out by the Overstreets, by our tendency to oversimplify.
The Non-Aristotelian Approach
Irving Lee emphatically dismissed the either-or dichotomy of
Aristotle with his statement that the "two-valued orientation is obviously
not similar structurally to the world of objects, happenings, people, feel-
19
lngs, etc." The founder of the non-Aristotelian system of general
18
Stuart Chase, Power of Words (Mew York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company, 195*0, P« 190.
"
19 /
^Irving J. Lee, language Habits in Human Affairs (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1941), p. 108.

20
semantics, Alfred Korsybski, pointed oat that the "facts of experience" are
20
Infinitely multi-valued. These thoughts of Lee and Korzybski are difficult
to accept, initially, because they violate the usual way of thinking—ve die*
like to have a concept, recognised for eone 2300 years, challenged.
In arguing against the non-Aristotelian approach of Lee and
Korsybski, ve can use as our basis the everyday observation that people are
either mle or female. On close examination, however, ve find that even this
apparently safe dichotossy is not true to nature* Kenneth Keyes Illustrated
the fallaciousness of this two-sided approach by pointing out that the femle
has glands that produce male hormones and excrete 70 percent as may male
hormones as the sale ; that the nale has glands that produce female hormones
and excrete 40 percent as many female hormones as the female. In the eb-
norml realm of nature, Keyes pointed out that there are about fifty recorded
21
cases of true hermaphrodites. But no medical or chemical proof is really
needed that many of the characteristics of one sex are found In the other.
Early in life ve recognise the shades of gray between the either-or extremes
by classifying some boys as "sissies" and some girls as "tomboys
.
M
Certainly there are some real life facts that are either-orj but not
to the extent that careless tail Biking would lead us to believe. Careful
thinking will open many possibilities of including the middle where it has
previously been excluded. Shis Is particularly evident when ve consider a
class of "things. " In examining a class, ve should bear in mind the fact
that a class is comprised of multi-valued items* each item differs from the
other in a matter of degree.
I ' ll I H lii-l ni.i l n il m i iiiiii ui i I i r i . n .i n ., ii i, ii i ii ii i r n . Hi
20
For examples* see Korsybski . Science and Sanity, p. 561.
Kenneth S. Keyes, Jr., How to Develop Your Tfrlnfrtng AbUlfo




But let us return to our process of abstracting previously dis-
cussed in chapter I as a way of examining the multivalued approach to a
class. When ve classify "things" ve abstract characteristics that are
23
similar and ignore characteristics that are different. For example, ve
classify certain animals according to common characteristics and label the
class "dog." But all of the characteristics of the Chihuahua, for example,
are not the same as all of the characteristics of the St. Bernard; yet both
are dogs. Further, in the class of St. Bernards, no particular St. Bernard
has all of the characteristics of any other particular St. Bernard. Con-
tinuing, a specific St. Bernard, at birth, does not possess all of the
characteristics of the same St. Bernard at five years of age. Thus, there
are variations between the items within a class and variations within a
specific item according to time.
To keep this multivalued, non-Aristotelian concept in mind as an
aid to clear thinking, Korzybski recommends using certain working devices
2k
which he calls Indexes, Dates, and Etc. "Index" numbers are used to
separate specifics from generalizations; they allocate a characteristic to
an individual rather than to a class containing the individual. "Dates" in-
dicate a change of characteristic with passage of time.
The Korzybskl an Index-approach to our general class of investors
with respect to their willingness to accept risk would be something like
this: Individuals within the total class of stock investors possess varying




" Korzybski, Science and Sanity * pp. xxxiil-xxxv; these pages give an
introductory treatment of Korzybski 's three working devices: Indexes,
Dates, and Etc. (The device of Etc. will not be discussed.)
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investors take unusual risk, nor that all strive for minimum risk; nor
vould it be proper to say that all investors can be grouped into either
extreme, for one extreme shades imperceptibly into the other. To indicate
this differentiation between investor characteristics, Index numbers will
now be assigned to the word "Investor" when speaking of a particular in-
vestor. Thus, investor1 is a specific investor, within the total group
of investors, with his own specific characteristics which are different,
to some degree, from all other Investors. Investor.,, then, is not the
same as investor-. If all investors were arrayed in descending order ac-
cording to the degree to which they were willing to accept risk in their
investments, they would range from No. 1 to No. 15,000,000 (based on an
• v 25
estimate of 15,000,000 stock market investors at the close of 1961)
.
Investor, would be at the extreme of "willingness to assume risk" end of
the array; investor.. „- ^^ would be at the other extreme end of the
array, i.e., complete unwillingness to assume risk* With the Index number
concept in mind, the absurdity of saying that "stock investors are specu-
lating to an excessive degree" is readily apparent. This statement may
well be true of investor, and those investors arrayed in proximity to him,
but it would be manifestly untrue of investor... q-q qqq and the investors
in proximity to him. It would be equally absurd to say that all investors
are either speculators or investors. Investor-
s00 qqq and a few million
other investors would probably object to such an arbitrary classification.
There are times, however, when the entire class of investors must
or should be referred to collectively. Since reference will be made to the
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Annual Report: 196l
,
•n. 9(1962), p. 2
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general class and not to a particular investor or group of investors within
the total class, the Index "n" will he used to indicate all investors.
Investor includes Investor., investor-, investor^, . . . investor-^
^qq qq..
Obviously, the assigning of Index numbers is a mental process. This
process has great use in making sense out of the vague generalities which all
too often are associated with the stock market. An excellent example is
found in the following statement made by Joseph Livingston before the Senate
Committee on "Banking and Currency:




capi reciation. They are not investors; they are
In terms of Index numbers, Mr. Livingston said: People are no longer ....
However, the reader must decode this meaningless statement by changing the
generalization of Mr. Livingston to the more accurate: People^,^ are no
some
longer .... Perhaps people ^ was a majority of people,.; but assuredly
some n
people was not people **~ *~ some * n
The non-Aristotelian continues his rebellion by recognising that the
characteristics of an individual are never at rest but change with the pas-
sage of time. As Max Born said, "It is odd to think that there is a word
27
for something which, strictly speaking, does not exist, namely "rest."
therefore, not only is investor not investor-, nor investor with respect to
1 • «
his speculative approach to the market, but investor., of 1929 was not neces-
sarily investor, of 1933* la other words, the degree of willingness of our
26
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Stock
Market Study; Report Ho. 376, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., May 26, 1955, p. 4*




extreme risk-taker, investor-, to assume risk in 1929 was probably not the
same as his degree of -willingness to assume risk in 1933* We must "date"
this same investor to denote his change in a particular characteristic:
Investor, rvir, is not the same as investor..--.1929 1933
To summarize indexing and dating; When we speak of investors , ve
do not fail into the semantic trap of confusing investor1 with investor.^ _* _;
»or do ve »tt the error of sayiBg that Investor.^ is suffering from the
mm speculative aania as investor^.
Ihe practical advantage to the investor with the non-Aristotelian
viewpoint is the flexibility of his approach to the risks of the stock
market. He recognizes that economic conditions, stock market conditions,
investor emotions, etc., are dynamic and are constantly ranging from one
extreme to another. Within the limits of his attributes, being free from
the constraints of the Aristotelian dichotomy, he is able to shift his in-
vestment philosophy from conservative to speculative by using all or any of
the in-between shades of gray rather than Jumping erratically from one
extreme to another. With rare exceptions, he holds both speculative and
conservative stocks, in varying proportions according to "the times." But
he is never a rigidly "pure" speculator or a "pure" conservative.
Why Speculafcers Are Bad
In Semantics , Walpole described the "pooh-pooh" and "bow-wow"
theories of speech origin which were advanced toward the middle of the 19th
28
century. 2he "pooh-pooh" school of thought held that man's first speech
consisted of words which were musical accompaniments to man's feelings.
23
" Walpole, chapter 2, pp. 38-62.

According to Walpole:
When one has a feeling of disgust or contempt one Is apt,
to take Darwin's example, "to blow out of the mouth or nos-
trils, and this produces sounds like pooh or pish." So these
words would be the names of feelings or emotions, and such
feelings would have labels that fitted very well for the good
reason that feeling and label both came from the same physio-
logical source.^9
The "bow-wow" theorists maintained, for example, that man heard a
dog barking and, in Imitation, barked himself* This bark of man became a
word which to early man meant "bark" or perhaps "dog" or, more likely,
either or both.
During this period of time, of course, there were many other
theories of speech origin. The two herein described were singled out by
Walpole as illustrating two different motives for using language. The
"bow-wowian" talks about something which exists; the "pooh-poohian" ex-
presses his own feelings. Disregarding the validity of either of these two
theories, Walpole pointed out that they provide examples of two different
functions of language. He refers to these two functions as referential ,
which is "bow-wow," and emotive, which is "pooh-pooh." According to
Walpole:
Referential language refers to objects or actions or situa-
tions which can be pointed to or described, and statements which
may be verified or disproved by the other fellow, aaotive lan-
guage expresses the speaker's feelings, and aims at stirring
those of the hearer . . . .30
^Ibid . , p. 39.
3
°Ibid
. , p. 40.

Thus, if a communl cation, transmitter wants to evoke a pleasurable
feeling or emotion, or desires to indicate approval of an event or thing,
he will use "good" words. For the opposite effect he will use "bad" words.
As an example, consider some of the emotive words used during a labor strike:
"Good" word: "Loyal" (employee)
"Bad" word: "Scab"
Company approval of the employee who remains on the Job during a
strike is implied by referring to him as a "loyal employee." As to members
of the labor union out on strike, disapproval of the same employee is Indi-
an
cated by the emotional reference to that seeb«
Both the "good" and the "bad" words applied to the nonstriking em-
ployee were evaluated as such because of the context of the situation within
which they were used. In some Instances, however, emotional reaction to a
word becomes so strong that the word Is "good" or "bad" without regard to
its context* A striking example of this was given by Stuart Chase when he
related the following case:
A superpatriotic organization proposed in 1953 to exclude
the phrase "little red schoolhouse" from discussions of
American education. The word "red" ignited the superpatriots,
who gave it a quite irrelevant political meaning. 3s
To this unnamed organization, the symbol "red" was bad, regardless of
context.
William Exton, Jr., "Semantics of Employee Relations," Effective
Communication on the Job , ed. M. Joseph Oooker (Hew York: American Manage-




Even more pathological is the emotional response to a single word
—
a word standing without context. So strong is the tendency in our culture to
react to emotive language that "practically anyone . . . reacts more or less
profoundly to isolated words. The communication receiver does not need
the context of a "pooh-pooh" word; so strong is his reaction that he can
evaluate and react emotionally to the word as it stands by itself:
Psychologists have developed an instrument which they call
a psychogalvanometer, and they use it to record changes in elec-
trical skin potential. Records taken hy this instrument show
that it is very common, even for so-called educated people, to
undergo changes in electrical skin potential in response to
hearing or reading isolated words such as mother, blood, love,
blue, etc.31*-
Given the emotional reaction to certain words, how does a word he-
come "had" or "good"? One can hypothesize that word reactions are largely
the results of an individual's inherited semantic environment and his rela-
tionships or experiences with "things." Inherited semantic environment
means that a word may he "had" because "authority" says it is bad and not be-
cause the individual has had experience with that which is supposed to be
Dad.
Initially, the child inherits the evaluative orthodoxy of his
parents. As the Overstreets pointed out, adults with their fixed "mental
and emotional lodging within religious, political, and economical ortho-
doxies ..." stifle the curiosity and wonder of their children by pushing




^Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, pp. 212-213.

yet experienced, the child learns to identify as being "bad; others, as being
good. And the child soon recognizes, as Lee put it, "that words go with or
reflect attitudes or feelings. "^ The child sees a dog for the first time;
the mother, who was once bitten by a dog, says, "Dog — Bad!" The child,
old enough to have learned what "bad" means, now recognizes its synonym-—
"dog." Unless by experience the child learns that the characteristics of dog1
that bit his mother are not the characteristics of dog^ the natural result
would be the child's yelling, "You dog!" at someone or some thing to indicate
his disapproval of him or it. The child, in short, is reacting to tiie symbol
and not the thing symbolized.
An interesting example of how experience van provoke emotional re-
actions to words, to the point of adopting the "ostrich sticking his head in
the ground" approach, was given by John Galbraith. In discussing the busi-
ness cycle, Galbraith pointed out that the word "crisis" was normally em-
ployed in the last century to indicate "bad times." But, as Galbraith further
pointed out, the word became "bad11 and caused the following word changes:
With time, however, this [crisis] acquired the connotation
of the misfortune it described. And Marx's reference to the
"capitalistic crisis" gave the word an ominous sound. The word
panic, which was a partial synonym a half century ago was no
more reassuring. As a result, the word depression was gradually
brought into use. This had a softer tone; it Implied a yielding
of the fabric of business activity and, not a crashing fall. Dur-
ing the Great Depression the word depression acquired from the
event it described an even more unsatisfactory connotation.
Therefore the word recession was substituted to connote an un-
fearsome fall in business activity. But this term eventually ac-
quired a foreboding quality and the recession of 1953-54 was
widely characterized as a rolling readjustment. Should we have a ,?
really serious rolling readjustment this phrase would become taboo.
J Irving J. Lee, How to Talk with People (Hew York: Harper &
Brothers, 1952), p. 95.
37John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1958)> pp. 44-45.
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To ttils quotation may also be added: "Little In language Is
i
rational. . . .
Is "speculator" a bad word? line following sample statements are
offered in answer to the question:
Modern usage has made the term "speculator" a synonym
for gambler and plunger. 39
There is ... a measure of moral opprobrium popularly
linked with speculation.^*
Speculators are naive persons who hope to use the secur-
ity markets as a means of getting rich with little effort.^1
[Speaking of speculators] Living by one's wits is always
somewhat contemptible.^
Speculation permits the stockholder to evade respon-
sibility.^
Undoubtedly, the word "speculator" in the context of the stock
market has acquired the connotation of "bad" in some such similar manner,
as have "crisis," "panic," "depression," and "recession" in the context of
business cycles. So supposition in explanation of how "speculator"
"^George Santayana, Dominations and Powers (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1951) > P» 1WL.
^Baruch, p. 105
.
Cowrie and Fuller, p. 9«
Wilson E« Wright, Forecasting for Profit (Hew York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 19^7) , P» 122.
Lawrence L. B. Angas, Investment for Appreciation (Sew York:
Somerset Publishing Co., 1936), p. 12.
^J. G. Hodgson, Wall Street: Asset or Liability? (Sew York:
The H. W. Wilson Company, 193*0 > P» 19.
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original ly assumed the label of '"bad" is advanced by the writer but an in-
dication can be obtained from the "Tulipmania" and the "Bubbles" of
Charles Mackay, who wrote an extensively detailed book on the delusions and
madness of crowds which gives an insight into the possible reason why the
kk
word "speculator" is a "bad" word. In his book, Mackay chronicled the
"ftLLipmania" of the Dutch which began in I63I+. Both the "South Sea Bubble"
of the English and the "Mississippi Bubble" of the French occurred in the
early 1700*s. In all three cases, the predominant impression was that of
the force and extent of the crowd madness behind each of these crazes; each
mania asserted itself as though an entire nation had been gripped in a
hysteria of gambling.
The degree of the hysteria can be typified by the following state-
ment by Mackay regarding the South Sea Bubble in which he lists the fantas-
tic purposes of several joint-stock companies founded in 1720, in England,
which were selling stock to the "people."
• • . but the most absurd and preposterous of all, and which
showed, more completely than any other, the utter madness of the
people, was one started by an unknown adventurer, entitled "a
company for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but
nobody to know what it is. "^5
Each of these manias, of course, spent itself, and in the wake of
each remained broken pocketbooks. As the suddenly rich became the suddenly
poor, the force and energy of tfce crowds were shifted from desperate gambling
to rage against the government and the "speculators" who provided better
kk
Charles Mackay, Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the
Madness of Crowds (2d ed.; London: Office of the national Illustrated
Library, 1«52).
^Ibld ., p. 53.
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targets for the crowd 1 s anger than the members of the crowd individually.
While "everyone" was getting rich, everyone was a speculator and saw nothing
wrong in speculation or speculators. But when "everyone" became poor, they
were no longer speculators but "hoodwinked innocents." In the aftermath of
each mania, the word "speculator" was assigned to those who, in the eyes of
the crowd, had caused the mania and had remained rich at the expense of the
crowd.
At the end of each mania, is there any wonder that speculators were
"bad"?
Bad Mackay lived in our times, he probably would have included a
chapter in his book titled, "Ihe U. S. Stock Mania of 1927-1929." Here,
again, can be seen evidence of the same delusions of the crowd as previously
recorded "by Mackay. And the aftermath of the 192$ stock market crash pro-
duced the same transfer ot crowd energy from desperate gambling to anger
against the government and "speculators." Irving Fisher, in discussing the
many causes assigned for the 1929 disaster, recited the following quotations
which originated after the suddenly rich became the suddenly poor:
Senator Glass blames the "stock gamblers."
Congressman Clyde Kelly blames "this nation-wide gambling
house which is called the Hew York Stock Exchange."
Senator Robinson of Arkansas blames President Hoover, Secre-
tary Mellon and Ex-President Coolidge for their "unduly optimis-
tic statements" about business conditions, which, he says, worked
the country into a fever of speculation.
The Reverend John Haynes Holmes holds the brokers and their
unholy ways responsible.

5Qie New York Times . . . excoriates the "nation-wide amy
of speculators, . . . "W>
Irving Lee said that:
. . . every expression of a man's relationship with a
thing, person, or situation will involve some feeling to
it, which feeling will "be reflected or involved in what he
says. ^7
Lee describes the feeling which can be induced from a relationship as ap-
proval, disapproval, or indifference. If approval results from some rela-
tionship, the individual uses what Lee termed "halo" words to reflect his
feelings; if disapproval results, the individual relies on what Lee called
"stigma" words to project his feelings into his words. In the preceding
quotations from the 1929 stock market debacle, the sentiment of those quoted
as regards the stock market crash certainly were reflected in their feelings
of disapproval. In their choice of stigma words, we find speculators,
brokers, and the Hew York Stock Exchange equated with gamblers, gambling
house, and unholy ways. If the word "speculator" had not been classified
as "bad" in the Tulipmanla of the 1600*8 and in the Bubbles of the 1700*s,
it was certainly classified as such in the Stock Market Mania of 1927-1929.
Wendell Johnson noted that:
• • . the wty in which we classify something determines in
large measure the way in which we react to it. We classify large-
ly by naming. Saving named something, we tend to evaluate it and
so to react to it in terms of the name we have given it.^°
Irving Fisher, The Stock Market Crash — and After (Hew York:






If, through long experience, nan has expressed his disapproval of various
financial crazes by venting his wrath on whatever he meant by "speculator,
"
and has classified the symbol "speculator" as bad, then by semantic inheri-
tance there will be individuals within our society who, without experience
or personal relationships, will react to "speculator" as connoting stigma.
m short, speculator^ are 1=ad because the word "speculator" is bad.
General Semantics and the Speculator
• . . man is at his best when he exercises the power of
reason. To the extent that he is unreasonable —* a creature
of impulse, of prejudice, or rationalizations -— he passes
judgments and performs actions that do not comport with the
realities of his environment.^
In these words of Overstreet, does the judgment that "speculator" is
bad comport with reality? Irving Lee said:
There is nothing intrinsic in a word that makes us use it for
either approval or disapproval .... A word has a stigma—or
a halo-function only when somebody uses or takes it so. 5°
Therefore, the stigma of the speculator reflects only the attitudes of some
individuals In our society who, by their semantic inheritance or personal
experience, desire the word to reflect their disapproval.
The general semantlcist, however, recognizes "speculator" as a high-
order abstraction) in its use, whether as a stigma or halo word, some






similarities of speculator^ have been abstracted while the differences
have been ignored. The term "speculator" to the general sematicist,
... is a verbal tent somewhere up in the stratosphere
and can mean all sorts of things at lover levels, hath good
and had. By itself, it means nothing. 51
Both for the purposes of developing the differences in "speculator"
at lover levels of abstraction and for using "speculator" as a halo word,
let us consider some of the "good" associated vith "speculator."
Speculation performs necessary functions
:
1. It brings prices into line.
2. It promotes stability of prices.
3. It directs capital Into places vhere
it is most useful.
Speculation is a means of insurance against unescap-
able risks. 53
I have defined a speculator as a man who observes the
future and acts before it occurs. 5*
Deliberate, planned speculation is, in my opinion, the
best and safest method to improve one's chances of preserv-
ing the purchasing power of capital or maintaining its con-
stant convertibility into cash vithout loss. 55
'» " '
H3tuart Chase, "Roadblocks to Understanding," Effective Corrcrcini ca-
tion on the Job, ed. Joseph M. Docker (Hew York: American Management
Association, 1956), p. 56.
^Hodgson, pp. 29-30.
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Anyone who la intfiitml to speculate should look at specu-
lation as a business and treat it as suck and not regard It
as a pure gamble as so Many people are apt to do*?5
Socially, in fact. In a capitalistic cojaounity, it is highly
desirable that there should exist a large body of well-Instructed
speculators .57
!Bius, from another viewpoint* "speculator" is a halo word.
oa» general eenanticist is not concerned, however, vita evaluating
the vord as either good or bsd. Since "speculation in itself nay do either
good or bana,"^ he is concerned only with insuring that the eaotive use of
the syabol "speculator,** by others, does not cause hie to react emotionally
to the symbol.
One general semantics approach is of significance to the investor
in his stock aarket activities* The weaning he assigns to "speculator" and
If he evaluates the foxmer as "bad" and the latter as "food* the probability
is great that he will xaias investment opportunities which would produce the
greatest return to those not concerned with the goodness and badness of
aBaanity is a peculiar class of life which, in sous
degree, determines its own destinies; therefore in prac-
tlcal life words and ideas become facts "••• facts* more** ert
over, which brdiig about important practical consequences.
i,
0' «mm>mmm>m»
*J.»«. L. lA-mrm*.. Bov to End, In Stock. (Mm, To*, Buell,









Korzybski then gave the illustration of men vho "have defined a stroke of
lightning as being the 'punishment of God" of evil men . . ," yet other men
have defined it as being simply an "electric spark." Ihe emotive concept of
the first definition prevented men from taking any action when their homes
vere struck by lightning for "to do so vould be against the •definition'."
Die practical consequence to these men was the loss of their homes. 2he
second, nonemotive definition had the practical consequence of men providing
60
their homes with lightning rods.
3he investor vith a multivalued, nonemotive viewpoint toward the
symbols, "speculator" and "investor," enjoys the practical consequence of
being free at any time to assume risk in his investments in any proportion
and to any degree he Judges to be correct.




THE SEARCH FOR INVESTMENT INFORMATION
The knowledge required for successful management of capital
is commonly quite foreign to the average individual's everyday
activities .... It is imperative under these conditions that
the investor have at least a realistic idea of the nature of
his problem . . . *£
—Dovrie and Fuller
We live in a world of words, which, when structured into sentences
give us information which may he factual and relevant to our search for
knowledge, or which may provide irrelevant or misleading information.
The decision hy an investor to take specific action in the stock
market is based on his judgment of the information available to him. Whether
his judgment is good or bad, it cannot "be better than the information on
2
which it is founded." To be a successful investor implies good judgment
which, in turn, requires reliable information. The obtaining of accurate
Information, then, is the "very crux of successful investing.
The problems facing the investor in his search for reliable informa-
tion are manifold. Initially, this chapter will consider the entroplc
characteristics of informational messages and the semantic noise barrier
erected to distort these messages. In the latter part of the chapter,
jDowrie and Fuller, p. k.
2
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specific examples of some of the problems encountered by the investor in
his search for information and advice will be discussed.
Semantic Entropy and Noise
Claude Shannon stated that "the fundamental problem of communication
is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a mes-
sage selected at another point." Shannon approached this problem from the
viewpoint of the engineer concerned only with the technical aspects of in-
creasing the probability of accuracy of electronic or electrical transmis-
sion of communication symbols. The social scientist and Shannon* s co-
author, Warren Weaver, saw in Shannon's mathematical theory of the engineer-
ing aspects of communication a significance that transcended the pure tech-
nical aspects of communication. Weaver contended that there are three
problem areas inherent in the broad subject of communication, rather than
the single one implied in Shannon's writings. These three levels, according
to Weaver, are:
Level A. How accurately can the symbols of
communication be transmitted?
(The technical problem.)
Level B. How precisely do the transmitted symbols
convey the desired meaning?
(The semantic problem.)
Level C. How effectively does the received meaning
affect conduct in the desired way? „
(She effectiveness problem. )
'
Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Com-
munication (Urbane, 111.: The University of Illinois Press., 19W, p. 3»
^Chase, p. 16.
Shannon and Weaver, p. 97
•
' Ibid . , p. 96.
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Weaver's thesis, contrary to Shannon's contention that the "semantic
aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem," is
that "the theory of Level A is, at least to a significant degree, also a
Q
theory of Levels B and C. Of significance to this paper is the relation-
ships of the theory of Level A to Level B; Level C is concerned with be-
havior and thus is disregarded.
If Weaver's thesis is correct, the entropy and noise concept applied
by Shannon to the technical problem of accurate communication symbol trans-
mission can be applied also to the semantic problem of conveying precise
meaning from transmitter to receiver.
Entropy is a measure of disorganization; it is the tendency of all
closed systems in the universe to deteriorate and lose their distinctive-
ness, to move from a state of organization and differentiation toward a
state of chaos and sameness. In communication theory, Shannon and Weaver,
>.
and Korbert Wiener advance the idea that it is possible to treat messages as
11having an entropy as if they were systems within the universe. Bms, any
transmitted message tends toward entropy, i.e.; a message tends to lose in-
formation in the process of being transmitted and received. As Stuart
Chase said:
Even the clearest message loses something in its journey,
and entropy is the same for the loss. Entropy is the idea
Ibid., P. 3 9ibid . , p. 98.
Herbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings (Garden City, Hew
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 195*+), p. 12.
Shannon and Weaver, pp. 18-26, and pp. 103-106; and Wiener, p. 21.

to
that things are running down—like a watch .... And now,
says Shannon, like messages. There is no question a*bout
entropy [in the accurate transmitting of communication
symbols] and it probably operates ... in the transfer of
meaning. 12
Semantic entropy, then, is the tendency for the meaning of a message
to "be lost as the message passes from the source of information to its
destination.
Using human speech as an example, the communication line begins with
an information source, the brain, prepared to send out a message, The mes-
sage is sent to the transmitter, the vocal system which, in turn, transmits
the message by sound waves through the air. The listener's ear—the
receiver—receives the sound waves and the message is transmitted to the
listener's brain, the destination. The listener's brain then decodes and
evaluates the message. Semantic entropy, in this case, would be the loss
in the meaning of the message, as it progressed, from the meaning intended by
the speaker to the meaning attached to the message by the listener.
This illustration returns us to chapter I wherein the thought was
expressed that, in communicating, the individual transmitting and the in-
dividual receiving, were sharing frameworks of reference; and that each in-
dividual involved in the ccsmraunication process has his own specific framework
of reference, which is not the same as any other's. As Exton said:
Every man carries his own context with him. The past
experience, and the character and intelligence and interests
of each individual affect the meaning—the real significance
to him—of what he hears or reads. 1:
12






To this statement may be added the observation that the speaker of words,
as well as the reader of words, attaches his own context to the
words he
selects to symbolize as to the meaning of his message.
Thus the meaning of the message transmitted is not necessarily the
meaning of the message received. This semantic entropy is the first prob-
lem faced by the investor when he attempts to derive meaning or reliable
information from the intended meaning of the transmitter of the message pur-
porting to contain information.
The second problem of the investor in his search for accurate in-
formation is the semantic "noise" which is interposed on the meaning of a
message as it travels from speaker to listener. "Boise" is always mechan-
ical in nature to the communication engineer but Chase maintained that
noise "should be expanded to cover 'semantic noise,' or distortions of
meaning not intended by the sender."
14
This semantic noise can be likened
to a barrier which is unconsciously erected by the listener which prevents
him from receiving the meaning intended by the information source. And, as
Kirk put it, semantic noise is always present in the communication process:
A bugaboo of coaammication is noise, a ghostly hand that
claws at a message somewhere between source and destination,
changing it into obvious nonsense or, what is worse, convert-
ing it into another meaningful but entirely misleading message.
Channels are never without some noise— . . . [such as] semantic
noise in the neural network of a human being trying to under-
stand.*5
Chase, Power Qf.Jteiflg> P» l3»
15John R. Kirk, "Communication Theory and Methods of Fixing Belief,
language, Meaning and Maturity, ed. Samuel I. Hayakawa (Hew York: Harper
& Brothers, 195*+), P« 113-'

te
An example of a semantic noise barrier is found in Carl Rogers'
discussion of the blocking of communication:
I would like to propose, as an hypothesis for considera-
tion, that the major barrier to mutual interpersonal communi-
cation is our very natural tendency to Judge, to evaluate, to
approve or disapprove, the statement of the other person, or
other group.
Should the receiver's emotions be touched by the incoming message, his
semantic noise barrier win be strengthened. As Carl Rogers continued:
Although the tendency to make evaluations is common in
almost all interchanges of language, it is very much heightened
in those situations where feelings and emotions are deeply in-
volved. So the stronger our feelings, the more likely it is
that there will be no mutual element in the communication.
Saere will be just two ideas, two feelings, two judgments,
missing each other in psychological space.17
An example of the truth of the latter statement of Rogers can be
found in the case of an investor who holds a stock which is depressed in
market price under that paid by the investor. In spite of information
which indicates the price of his stock will drop even more than it already
has, the investor tenaciously holds his stock in the belief that it wiH
come back to its original price level, and thus not require him to sell at
a loss. As the price of his stock continues to decrease, the investor be-
comes "locked-in" his investment to the point where any belated decision to
sell would cause a sizeable economic loss greatly out of proportion to that
which would have been sustained had he originally sold at a small loss*
Carl R. Rogers, "Communication: Its Blocking and Its Facilita-
tion," language, Meaning and Maturity, ed. Samuel I. Hayakawa (Mew York:
Harper & Brothers, 195^T, P« 5^-
17Ibid . t pp. 5^-55.
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The investor's emotions, in this illustration, prevented him from thinking
unprejudiced by his position in the stock* His sentiment against taking a
loss, even though the loss initially would have been small, prevented him
from making an unprejudiced assessment of his position. The emotional
feeling against taking a loss was further fortified by his equally emotional
feeling that his stock would return, in time, to its original purchase
price level* And well it might, but how long will the investor have his
capital "frozen" in an unprofitable investment? Would not the investor have
protected his capital better had he initially sold his stock, taken a small
capital loss, and reinvested in a stock that held promise for capital gain
in the immediate rather than in the indefinite future?
The semantic noise barrier is not erected by the investor alone*
His informational source may well induce semantic noise in the communication
line in the same manner as the investor himself. The investor, then, must
constantly be on guard against accepting as fact that which is not fact.
As Stuart Chase stated the problem, one of the roadblocks to understanding
19
"is the confusion of facts with inferences or opinions or value judgments."
To be noted at this point is the distinction which has been drawn
between semantic entropy and semantic noise. The distinction is artificial
in the sense that semantic noise is one of the causes of semantic entropy,
i.e., it is a part of the whole. The distinction has been drawn to empha-
size what is considered to be the two-fold nature of many of the informa-




Stuart Chase, "Roadblocks to Understanding," Effective Communica-
tion on the Job, ed. M. Joseph Docker (Hew York: American Management Asso-
ciation, 1956), p. 53.
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1. The reception of Investment information vith the same meaning
attached by the receiver to the words of the message a3 in-
tended by the transmitter.
2. The reception of investment information devoid of emotional
reactions by the investor and screened by the investor to
separate the facts from the opinions, emotions, and Judg-
ments of the transmitter.
Problems Encountered in the Search for
Information and Advice
"Information" is a symbol which stands for the content of what an
individual exchanges with the outer world as the individual adjusts to that
20
world and makes his adjustment felt upon it. Since an individual's per-
sonal experiences are limited to his day-to-day sphere of activity, he must
of necessity turn to others for the bulk of his contact with the world out-
side the reach of his first-hand information. Mass media such as newspapers,
periodicals, radio, and television provide the maximum of the individual's
information of his outside world.
The daily newspaper, from the standpoint of volume and area of
coverage, is pre-eminent among the mass media as a source of information.
As important as the newspaper is in shaping our concept of the outside
world, it must be recognized as the product of a highly developed abstrac-
tive process.
As an example of this abstractive process, assume that an event






observations of the event those events which he feels are most representa-
tive. When he telephones his story in to the rewrite man, he relates what
he believes to be the most significant facts concerning the event. At this
stage in the development of a newspaper report of an event, we should recog-
nize that the reporter has performed an abstraction; he has not told "all"
of the event, he has told only part of it. Prom chapter I we know that he
cannot tell all even if he desired to do so; further, since he has evaluated
his observations of the event, what he selects as being most pertinent and
meaningful may not necessarily be most meaningful to others.
The rewrite man selects certain of the facts and inferences of the
reporter as being those which, in his judgment, will best tell a story of the
event. After completing his rewrite of the reporter's story and simultane-
ously moving the news up another rung in the abstraction ladder, the story
goes to the copy desk where it may well be shortened in the process of being
checked for accuracy, etc.
Upon completion of these ascents up the abstraction ladder, the
Gtory, if it involves "policy," goes to any number of editors, who, in turn,
add the editorial viewpoint to the story. The story which, even at its in-
ception, bore slight resemblance to reality, has now gone through even
higher levels of abstractions, coupled with inferences drawn from fact and
includes the value judgment of nonobservers—the editors—which have been
added for good measure. The surviving remnants of the original story are now
subjected to the special brand of abstracting practiced by the make-up editor.
The make-up editor determines the allowable length of the story, where
it shall be placed in the newspaper, and the kind of headline to use. When
finally transformed into type, the story may be forced to yield to yet one




lines of type If the copy will not fit into the allotted space. This
mystical newspaper story has passed through a continuous process of ab-
straction. The facts have "been distilled into the final easily read news-
paper shadow story of the event. As Stuart Chase said when discussing the
liabilities of mass media, "Knowledge when permitted to come through is
22
packaged in easy capsules, to he swallowed at a gulp."
Perhaps this is too harsh an indictment of newspapers; possibly the
fault rests in the attitude of the readers: "Says John Hersey with a fine
irony: 'If we must read, we demand brevity, generous typography, mean para-
graphs, philosophy that has been run through a chewing machine and been
eased with editorial pepsin and bile. ' ** Regardless of where the blame
does or should rest, the fact remains that the flow of information from
event to published story is not free of distortion and omissions. The news-
paper, as a specific element of our communication process, is no exception
to the observation of H. A. Overstreet that "in no area of our maturity




At this point one may well ask, What has this discussion of the
daily newspaper to do with the stock market? The answer is that the public
has been estimated to receive as much as 90 percent of its financial
2i
" i)onald M. Schwartz, "General Semantics and the Reporter's Job,"
Tangnage, Meaning and Maturity, ed. Samuel I. Hayakawa (Hew York: Harper
& Brothers, 195 2*), P* 3A0.
22




Overstreet, The Mature Mind, p. 3k.
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25information from daily newspapers. The fact that financial news is
normally included in a special section of the newspaper, generally far
removed from the front page, does not decrease its susceptibility to the
abstractive process previously described. In fact, financial articles may
well include more of the abstractive process than the conventional news
story. In reporting on corporate financial events, for example, the re-
porter or columnist rarely, if ever, experiences these events firsthand;
in most cases his story stems from an abstraction prepared by a corporate
official possessing more than a nodding acquaintance with the art of public
relations
.
Not even the impersonal world of daily stock market statistics is
capable of escaping the abstractive process of the newspaper writer. On
any given trading day the action of but a handful of stocks is analyzed as
if the interpretation of their action was all that was necessary to describe
a day's activity in the stock market. All too often newspaper articles ex-
plaining market action are written by those who do not themselves know why
the market acted as it did, but must write something to fill space and at
26
the same time make it sound plausible.
The daily newspaper, although it may be the most popular source of
financial information, is certainly not the only source of that information.
The investor, whether novice or professional, will experience no difficulty
in finding additional sources of information about either individual stocks
or the stock market as a whole. As Clendenin said, "There is probably no
other industry or type of business as abundantly supplied with trade
25
'Douglas H. Bellemore, Investments—Principles, Practices and





literature as is the securities business." ' Examples of the diversity
and volume of information may be found in any issue of The Wall Street Jour-
nal or BarroriB . As a specific example, the iMarch 5, 1962 issue of Barron's
carried a total of k6 advertisements for various kinds of information on
the stock market and individual stocks. This was, of course, in addition
to the articles and statistical information presented by this weekly's staff
and guest writers on the same subject.
The problem of the investor is not that of finding information; it
is, rather, the problem of wading through the phletora of available infor-
28
mation to find that which Is meaningful and accurate. The aspect of the
abstractive process of this problem as followed in publishing a daily news-
paper has already been considered. But the problem is even greater than
that imposed by the process of abstracting. As examples, Dice and Eiteman
pointed out some semantic noise barriers in their discussion of the art of
reading the financial page:
One must be on guard . . . every minute for propaganda,
crowd psychology, deliberate deception, half-truth, long-time
news interpreted as representing the immediate situation,
gossip, rumor, ill-advi3ed opinion, and facts which appear
adequate but in reality cover up facts of opposite import.29
Even this apparently all-inclusive list of pitfalls for the unwary
investor needs at least one more consideration, that is, what is published
is designed to be sold. As Overstreet pointed out, in our society knowl-
edge is something to be sold, as a commodity, to as many people as possible.









that of sales appeal rather than of accuracy and utility. "It is not
surprising, under these conditions, that information and misinformation
31
reach the public in an undifferentiated mass . . . '*
Success in differentiating between sources of meaningful informa-
32
tion and misinformation does not come to the investor over night. In
fact, according to one successful broker-investor, G. M. Loeb, the majority
of investors will never be capable of discriminating "between sources of
33
valuable and sources of misleading information.' It is no vender, then,
that some investors seek help from an investment informational or advisory
service.
Investment informational or advisory services can generally be
classified into two broad categories according to their reporting
procedures:
1. Those providing "facts as dispassionately as possible,
leaving all interpretations to the investor."
2. Those providing "an analysis which offers interpreta-
tions and conclusions. "3^
Investment services in the first category require the investor to
make his own interpretations of the data presented and to arrive at his own
investment decisions, accordingly. Assuming the service presents reliable
facts, this approach of the individual investor making his independent
30









analysis and decision on the "basis oi* the service's data will probably
35produce the most successful investor.
Many investors, however, realize from sad experience that they lack
i 36
the qualifications and/or time to manage their own investments. Hence,
the fact that they have reliable, basic data on hand is meaningless, The
advisory services of the second category—those that provide interpretations
and conclusions—will have an appeal for such investors. "After all, it is
easier to review the conclusions of others rather than to formulate one's
own.
Although there may be a variety of reasons why an investor sub-
scribes to an advisory service of the second category, most investors sub-
scribe "in the expectation of making speculative or Investment gains from
38
its recommendations.' Unfortunately for the expectations of the investor,
The editors of the investment literature are not so
Infallible that their advice can be followed without hesi-
tation. In fact, they do not agree with each other; two
leading advisory services recently published their lists
of the 100 best buys chosen from the same 3*200 stocks.
Only 17 stocks appeared on both lists. 39
Alfred Crowles, after making two studies of financial services and
publications, concluded that with rare exception they had an average record
that was worse than that of the average common stock over the period
^Kamm, p. 122.
^ Bellemore^ p. 305.
^Clendenin, p. 279*
^John Schulz, The Trend & Value Publications Prospectus (Mew York:






studied. Although note is taken of the word "average" in Crowles*
conclusion, it would still appear that the investor has a formidable task
in selecting the proper investment service. She general semanticist will
also "date" the services that had outperformed the average stock—the
successful service^j. may not he the successful service-q^g.
One semanticist will also note that the words "conclusions" and
"recommendations" were used as if synonymous in the two preceding para-
41
graphs. The distinction drawn between these two symbols by Schulz will
be of academic interest to semanticists and of possible profit-and-loss
interest to the investor utilizing some form of investment service.
Schulz pointed out that the conclusions presented by his invest-
ment service are the:
. . • byproducts of the process of interpretation to which
we subject the material—objective as well as intangible-Tit
our disposal. Biis material inevitably includes numerous variables.
Its interpretation therefore becomes possible only S)gr the exer-
cise of judgment, which means it is fallible .... The result- ^2ing conclusions thus are the personal opinions of the interpreter.
Schulz added that these conclusions should not be treated as recommenda-
tions by the service subscribers. He pointed out that the conclusions of
the service interpreters are valid only to the interpreters; that is, the
interpreters conclude what they should do on the basis of their judgment and
interpretation. But the service cannot,
40
Alfred Crowles, "Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?"
Eepnometrica, July, 1933* PP. 323-324; and "Stock Market Forecasting,"
Econometrica , July-October, 1944, p. 214.
4l
John Schulz is a "Point and Figure" technician, a stock market




, . . recommend what you should do, because we cannot know
the numerous additional considerations—many of them subjective
and personal—that you will have to superimpose on the conclu-
sions of others in working toward your own decisions in specu-
lations and investments. *o
In this excellent discourse by Schulz, the aemanticist further
sees the possibility of different frameworks of reference between trans-
mitter and receiver and how semantic entropy can distort the meaning of the
transmitter. And what is true and possible in the case of the specific in-
vestment service represented by John Schulz can also be true and possible in
the case of any investment service.
A final point should be considered in this brief examination of the
category-2 advisory service, that is, those that interpret and provide
conclusions*
Statements are made from time-to-time by certain of the investment
kk
services about how they outperformed the market. It -would appear that
an investor could solve all his investment information problems if he sub-
scribed to the service that gave evidence of the best past record, and if
he faithfully followed its advice. But the truth of this hasty conclusion
is subject to at least three conditions:
1. That the investor is a "millionaire." y
2. That, if the investor is not a "millionaire, " he
can successfully superimpose his success ratio
" '" " i ' ' ' » i i i i .i ! i
°Ibid
. , p. 3.
kk
Biese are typically found in Barron's and One WaH Street Journal
and normally stated relative to the performance of the Dow-Jones Industrial
Average.
kS
"The word "millionaire" is used as a symbol that the investor must
be of well-above average means; not as a precise quantitative measure.
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(in selecting stocks) on the success ratio of the in-
vestment service and equal the performance of the
latter.
3* Tnat the service is as successful in the future as
it has been in the past.
Only the first two of these conditions will be discussed, as the third is
considered to be obvious. For the discussion of the first two conditions,
the investment service provided by Arnold Bernhard & Co., Inc., in its
Value Line Investment Survey, is used as an example.
The Value Line Investment Survey classifies securities on which it
reports into five groups and according to four attributes. Group I is
the "highest" group with respect to a specific attribute, and Group V is
the "lowest; " The attributes used by the service are:
1. Quality
2. Yield
3. Bank for Market Performance Next 12 Ifonths
k. Rank for 3- to 5-year Appreciation Potentiality.
Thus, a particular stock may be in Group I with respect to Quality, in
Group III with respect to yield, and so on. For brevity in discussion, it
is assumed that an investor is interested in only one attribute, say, "Rank
hifor Market Performance Next 12 Months." ' Therefore, our mythical investor
^Arnold Bernhard, The Evaluation of Common Stocks (Hew York: Simon
Schuster, 1959) > Chap*. II through IV, pp. 38-HfO.
hi
'The reader will recognize that this woul
ityj the careful investor would consider all four attributes.
d not be done in actual-

will be concerned only vith the stocks rated in Group I vith respect to
that one attribute—those having the "highest" probability of favorable
market performance in the next year.
She investor's first difficulty vith this service will be en-
countered when he finds that there are approximately 160 stocks in Group I.
How does he select, out of 160 stocks, the number that he is capable of
buying? As Bernhard was careful to point out, records of his service's
performance are based on the average price performance of the entire group
and "does not refer to the performance of every single stock in the group,"
nor does it "imply that every stock in Group I outperformed every stock in
Group II, and so on down the line." therefore, unless the investor is
a "millionaire," how does he buy 160 stocks to insure that he will have the
same measure of success as the average of Group I?
Shis question is not overlooked by Bernhard. Acknowledging the im-
possibility of purchasing such a substantial number of stocks, he stated
that the investor should diversify sufficiently to hold a representative
sample and he gave 20 stocks as being a good estimate of the number required
50
to insure about the same performance as the Group average. The point that
the purchase of SO stocks does or does not require funds above the means of
the "average" investor will not be argued. But Mr. Bernhard, whose entire
51basis for his ratings is that of statistics, should be reminded that as a
Ibid., p. 122. One figure of 160 is the figure quoted in





"The word "statistics" is used in its singular sense.
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statistician, he has minimized the fact that he is asking his subscribers
to take a probability of a probability; that is, the subscribers are asked
to superimpose their success ratio in selecting from Bernhard's 160 stocks
on Bernhard's success ratio in selecting from the total of stocks under his
review.
For purposes of illustrating the investor's problem of taking a
probability of a probability, let us assume that Bernhard's success ratio
has been 70 percent and that this ratio will continue. Ee therefore has a
.7 probability of being right in his stock ratings. With approximately 160
stocks in Group I, he will be "right" to some degree on 112 of these stocks
and "wrong" to some degree on the remaining k8. Assuming that our investor
is going to diversify and has sufficient funds to purchase 20 of the total
of 160 stocks in Group I, what is his probability of maintaining Bernhard's
.7 probability of being right? The investor may be so fortunate as to
select 20 of the 112 stocks that are going to be "right." In this event,
his success ratio is 100 percent and he has outperformed Bernhard. But the
investor may be highly unfortunate and select 20 of the kQ stocks that
prove to be "wrong." Certainly there is more probability of selecting 20
out of the 112 good stocks than there is the probability of selecting 20
out of the k8 "bad" stocks, but there still remains some degree of risk
-that the investor will implement a larger percentage of incorrect selec-
tions than correct ones; in fact, regardless of how small it may be, there
is always the probability that all 20 of the investor's selections from
the 160 available will be "bad."
Although an investment service may provide better results for an
investor than an investor may be capable of himself, it is not the
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... he was seized with a prophetic ecstasy; he
danced with wild abandon, sang, jabbered inarticulate
sounds, and foretold future events. •*•
—Manly Palmer Hall
Premise and Arguments
Even though an investor is one of the select few who
is capable of developing reliable information, he still
has the problem of determining the market significance of
his reliable information.2
In short, the investor must assemble facts and then make inferences from
these facts. A simplified example of this process can be given as follows:
lact: Corporation ABC's earnings for the fiscal
year just ended are double those of the
previous fiscal year.
Inference: The market price of ABC's stock will
rise.
The fact of the earnings increase is verifiable at the instant the fact is
stated or known. But the intangible of the inference is not verifiable, in
the sense used here, at the instant of completion of the mental process by
^fenly P. Hall, The Secret Teachings of All Ages (9th ed.;





which it is made. Bie inference is verifiable only in the future when,
in retrospect, the increase in the market price of ABC's stock proves that
the inference was correct. Or the decrease in the market price of ABC's
stock shows that the inference vas wrong.
Whether or not the investor makes a correct decision to purchase
or not to purchase ABC's stock, depends upon the value of his inference
drawn from the verifiable fact. Since his inference, as used here, is
concerned with the future, the investor's inference becomes a forecast of
the future.
Premise : With few exceptions, e.g., the sale of stocks to settle
an estate, the decision to buy, sell, or hold a stock, or do nothing, is
based on a forecast that the market price of a stock is going up, down,
or will hold its present price.
At least three objections to this broad statement can be advanced
immediately. One argument against this premise would be the citing of an
investor who invests in stock for the sole purpose of drawing income from
dividends and who makes no effort to forecast the future price of his
stock. If such an investor actually exists, he will either be "lucky" or
else unsuccessful in his stock market operations. And this is said in the
strongest sense of the Aristotelian either-or orientation.
If, after purchasing a stock, this dividend-only oriented investor
decides to sell because of necessity or desire, he will be lucky if the
sales price of his stock, plus dividends received, is no less than the
original cost price of the stock, plus the loss or minus the gain in pur-
chasing power of his invested funds, plus the income tax on dividends re-
ceived and all charges for both the purchase and sale of his stock. He will
be lucky in the sense that, as stock prices are always changing, he happen-
ed to sell at just the right time.
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He has been unsuccessful If the sales price of his stock, plus
dividends received, is less than the original cost price of the stock, plus
the loss or minus the gain in purchasing power of his invested funds, plus
the income tax on dividends received and all charges for both the purchase
and sale of his stock.
She second argument against the premise would be advanced by the
investor who purchases stock for either dividend income or capital appre-
ciation, or both, based on the upward secular trend of stock prices. Els
argument would be that he Is not required to forecast because stock prices
have been advancing in a long-term upward trend at the rate of approximately
3-lA$ per year. Therefore, all he has to do is invest in quality stocks
and "let his money ride." In the long run, he will be successful and will
never be concerned with forecasting.
As a matter of fact, this Investor has made at least two stock
market forecasts in advancing his argument. By relying on the secular
trend to Insure that stock prices, in the long run, will go up, he has
rendered a forecast; that is, he has made a forecast based on past action.
By asserting his capability of picking quality stocks, he must be fore-
casting that, in the indefinite future, the price of these stocks will not
go down or, if they do go down, they will eventually come back up to a point
at least equalling their purchase price.
And this investor should also realize that he is forecasting that
he has patience and, further, that he can maintain an unemotional attitude
toward market price fluctuations. Certainly the investor who purchased
n>iee and Eiteman, pp. 233-23^.
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stocks at or near the high of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average in 1929
had to exercise considerable patience and an unemotional attitude as he
waited a quarter of a century for the Industrial Average to return to the
point where it was when he made his purchases.
The third argument against the premise can be raised by citing
the various formula plans that promise stock market profit without fore-
casting. An excellent example of the absurdity of this belief is found
in a book with the appropriate title, Stock Iferket Profit without Fore-
k
casting . In the Introduction to this book, the author, Edgar Genstein,
stated: "Formula plans involve no forecasting • • >" and two sentences
later, ". • . it is implicitly assumed by any formula plan that there will
be substantial upward and downward movements in stock prices in the future,
5
Just as there has been in the past. 1 Is not the implicit assumption of
the future a forecast of the future?
Possibly the equating of an implicit assumption with a forecast is
too tenuous to prove the absurdity. Hot tenuous, however, are the "buy"
and "sell" signals given by the author's formula plan. First, singling
out the author's "buy" signal for scrutiny, what is a "buy" signal other
than a recommendation to buy a stock? And why buy if the stock price is
not expected to rise? Does it not follow that a "buy" signal is a forecast
of rising prices? Second, when does the investor following Genstein'
s
formula sell? He sells when the formula gives the "sell" signal. And,
k
Edgar S. Genstein, Stock Ifarket Profit without Forecasting






according to the author, his nonforecasting formula gives the signal to
sell when stocks are over-priced; in other words, when 3tock prices can he
expected to drop. Is this not forecasting?
Genstein's formula does not help the investor select a particular
stock—the formula determines only the time to buy and sell "based solely on
7
the market as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. ' The investor
thus retains the residual problem of determining what stock should he
bought after Genstein's formula says "buy." And the problem of determining
the stock to be bought takes us back to the beginning where the investor,
whether he likes it or not, has to make a forecast.
Completion of this side-excursion brings us back to the original
premise that, with few exceptions, the investor bases his investment de-
cisions on a forecast*
Two Aspects of Stock Market Forecasts
Whether the investor makes his own forecasts or relies on the fore-
casts of others, he is confronted with the fact that these predictions deal
with probabilities on two variable planes, that is, "price" and "time."
The first, price, is concerned with forecasting that the price of a stock
or the value of a market index is going up, down, or will hold relatively
steady. A price forecast may involve setting a definite price goal or it
may be given in broader terms, which is more common, that the price is going
up or down but with no definite quantitative measure of the price movement
being given. The second variable, time, is nebulous and is rarely
' Ibid
. , pp. 2it—63. One exception pointed out by Genstein where his





identified when considering stock market forecasts; in fact, it is rarely
referred to. If, for example, a definite price goal is forecast for a
stock, it is common for the forecaster to ignore the time when this price
goal should be reached. Or, if the price forecast is given in nonquantita-
tive terms, no forecast is given for the period of time within which the
price movement is expected.
She nebulous character of "time" when applied to stock market fore-
casting was well brought out by Daniel Seligman in his series on personal
9investing in Fortune . Seligman, in discussing point and figure chartists,
brought up the question of how long should a prediction remain unfulfilled
before the forecaster should acknowledge that he was wrong* Bdmunrt Tabell
answered, ". . .no time limit could be put on a target's fulfillment."
Seligman continued:
12>
Schulz " is especially mysterious on this subject. "Price
targets," he has written, "may generally be presumed to imply
a degree of probability that the price level they identify will,
in due course, be reached. "13
To paraphrase Seligman, all we have to do now is define "due course."
Maekay, writing about the prophecies of Ifostradamus, made an ob-
servation pertinent to the "time" aspect of stock market forecasting:
^Daniel Seligman, "Bie Mystique of Point and Figure," Fortune,
March, 1962, p. 113.
Edmund Tabell is head of institutional research for, and a partner
of, Walston & Co. His weekly market letter has a circulation of 30,000.
Seligman, p. 113*





[Die prophecies of Hostradamus] take so great a latitude,
both as to time and space, that they are almost sure to be
fulfilled somewhere or other in the course of a few centuries.
A little ingenuity . . . might easily make events to fit some
of them.15
Mackay also discussed the English astrologer, Lilly, who attempted to con-
vince the House of Commons that he had foretold the great fire of London.
Lilly maintained that he had forecast the fire in his Monarchy or no Monarchy
"in the form of an hieroglyphical plate representing on one side a large city
in flames— . . . "
"Did you foresee the year of the fire?" said a member.
"Bo" quoth Lilly, "nor was 1 desirous. Of that I made
no scrutiny. "3-5
The element of time seems to be as much a problem to our modern day
stock market forecasters as to the prophets of old. In general, it is ig-
nored now as it was centuries ago.
Forecasting Methods
Nebulous as the time aspect of forecasting may be, it is still neces-
sary that the investor, if he desires to be successful, attempt to determine
the correct time to buy and sell. 'lucre are many different methods in use
for forecasting market and stock prices, 'ihe two major classifications
which include the majority of all methods, with the exception of those based
16




Wilson E. Wright, Forecasting for Profit (Hew York: B. C. Forbes
and Sons Publishing Co., Inc., 1953)* P» 102. Wright mentioned an occasion
when he investigated an advisory service and found that its "recommendations




and the technical. The fundamentalists are investors "who try to foresee
the future by analyzing financial and operating data about the company . . .
According to Edwards and Magee:
The stock market fundamentalist depends on statistics.
He examines the auditors' reports, the profit-and-loss
statements, the quarterly balance sheets, the dividend
records and policies of the companies whose shares he has
under observation. He analyzes sales data, managerial
ability, plant capacity, the competition. He turns to
bank and treasury reports, production indexes, price sta-
tistics and crop forecasts to gauge the state of business
in general, and reads the daily news carefully to arrive at
an estimate of future business conditions. Taking all
these things into account, he evaluates his stock; if it
is selling currently below his appraisal he regards it as
a buy. 3- -
Tie technicians, on the other hand, are Investors "who try to fore-
see the future by analyzing the behavior of the stock itself. Technicians
are usually chartists, ..." Edwards and Magee, who are chartist-
technicians, defined technical analysis as follows;
The term technical in its application to the stock market
has come to have a very special meaning, quite different from
its ordinary dictionary definition. It refers to the study of
the action of the market itself as opposed to the study of the
goods in which the market deals. Technical Analysis is the
science of recording, usually in graphic form, the actual his-
tory of trading (price changes, volume of transactions, etc.)
in a certain stock or in "the averages" and then deducing from
that pictured history the probable future trend. 2*-
17








Edwards and Magee, p. 5.
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As might be expected from the stated definitions of fundamentalist
and technician, there have developed two opposing schools of thought as to
which is the correct or best method to use. In reading the literature, it
seems as though one is re-reading the arguments for and against speculating
and investing. Dice and Eiteman, for example, pointed out that the most
22
successful investors are those who follow the fundamental approach.
Edwards and Magee disagreed and pointed out that the charts of the techni-
cian "are far more prescient than the best informed and most shrewd ..."
23
of the fundamentalists.
The technicians and the fundamentalists, however, cut across the
boundaries of the speculator-investor controversy. For example, Bernard
2k
Baruch, a speculator, used the fundamental approach to his investments.
G. M. Loeb, another speculator, uses the technical approach to his stock
25
market operations.
Also similar to the speculator-investor controversy is the "bad-good"
word connotation for technician-fundamentalist. As Schulz pointed out,
fundamental analysis "has attained a certain academic standing, while tech-
nical analysis has not ..." A possible explanation for the attachment
of a stigma connotation to "technician" is given by Seligman:
^)ice and Eiteman, pp. 226-227.







A chartist is, to begin with, a technician .... Chart-
ing was generally in had odor during the 1920* s and early
1930' »• It was associated with stock manipulations—i.e., the
manipulators kept charts of price and volume activity, looking
for ways to control the prices of stocks on minimal investments;
at the same time a few traders tried to use charts in an effort
to detect manipulations. Aside from these shady connotations,
there was always a widespread suspicion that the chartists
were all a little crazy.^7
Over the years, however, "the charting of stocks, once a recondite
art practiced only "by a few Wall Streeters, is becoming the recondite pre-
28
occupation of masses of investors." Apparently the acceptance of the tech-
nician and his charting approach by greater numbers of nonprofessional in-
vestors has erased much of the original stigma. This change was attested to
by Seligman when he said: "It is apparent that charting has now become
29
respectable."
The multivalued approach to the symbols, "technician" and "funda-
mentalist," recognizes that both deal with certain variables and intangibles
that are inherent in any type of forecasting. Both deal with probabilities
and both require inferences to be drawn from information which, hopefnTTy,
is free of semantic noise and has not suffered from semantic entropy. The
general semanticist recognizes that neither approach to forecasting "can ever
achieve complete success ... As Schulz said:
There are . . . aspects of technical analysis with which
fundamental analysis cannot compete, just as there are aspects
27
Daniel Seligman, "Playing the Market with Charts," Fortune ,
February, 1962, p» Ho.
^Ibid.
^Ibid .
^ Schulz, p. k.
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of fundamental, analysis into which the technical approach can-
not penetrate. There is thus every reason for supplementing
the one approach with the other, and no reason whatever to use
either of them to the exclusion of the other as the sole basis
for decisions in investment and speculation.31
Attitude Toward Forecasting
The perfect forecaster would have to know all there was to know
about a particular stock. But as indicated in chapter I, no one can know
all about anything. The investor, therefore, should not waste either his
time or money in searching for the perfect forecasting method, for none
exists.
Peter Drucker, in discussing management decision-making, made a
statement which directly applies to the investor rmklng an investment de-
cision based on a forecast where all is not known and never will he known:
The manager [investor] will never he able to get all the
facts he should have. Most decisions have to be based on in-
complete knowledge— . ... To make a sound decision, it is
not necessary to have all the facta j but it is necessary to
know what information is lacking in order to Judge how much of
a risk the decision involves. 32
The investor must be aware of the abstractive nature of a forecast.
Since he cannot, nor can anyone else, know all there is to know about a
stock, what he does know is an abstraction from the total of reality. The
parts of the whole that have been neglected in the investor's abstractive









Another problem involved in the abstractive process of forecasting
was stated by Wright:
The time spent studying abstract situations involving many-
variables may produce a state of mind in which many answers
may be conceived to almost any problem—there being no single
choice upon which action can be taken. Anything becomes pos-
sible, and nothing is probable. 3^
The investor should further attempt to separate himself from emo-
tional reactions when attempting to forecast stock price movements. As
Baruch said:
My years in Wall Street . . . became one long course of
education in human nature. Hearly always the problem that
arose in the Stock Exchange * . . was how to disentangle the
impersonal facts of a situation from the elements of human
psychology which came with these facts. 35
This separation of the Investor from his emotions is a worthy objective, but
for the average investor it is virtually impossible. In discussing the
weathervane type of advisory service that fluctuates in its advice in keep-
ing with current conditions, Kamm observed:
. . . this same variation in philosophy is typical of
the average investor. When things look pessimistic, he
feels that way. When conditions look optimistic, he feels
optimistic. 3o
In short, the forecaster-investor "possesses only human images and concepts
.... His knowledge is an ideal figment . . . dramatized by his private
bright, p. 6.
""Baruch, p. ix.
3 Kamm, p. 126.
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37passions.""" In view of these obstacles to forecasting, it is no wonder
that one attitude toward predicting stock prices is that of simply dis-
regarding forecasting and forecasters "on the ground that no prophet can
38he ' completely certain, * . . . But the more desirable attitude for the
investor is that stated by Wright:
A second attitude implies ... a recognition that the
fallibility of prophets is not something unusual, ... A
full consciousness on our part that prophets . . . abstract
from the totality will prevent despair and cynicism on the
one hand and disappointment on the other* Prophecies must
be looked upon not as infallible truths but as possible
guides and hints of what probably will happen. i9
The investor must assume that every forecast contains an error. The
Important consideration is not that the forecast contains an error, but
kO
"the magnitude and direction of the error."









Many have the greed but not the talent.
—Unknown
What Is Success in the Stock Market?
The Aristotelian dichotomy recognizes man as being either a success
or a failure. But man may succeed in one endeavor and fail in another.
What, then, is he, a success or a failure?
If man strives for success in the absolute, Aristotelian two-valued
sense, it will forever elude him. Xt eludes him, as Wendell Johnson pointed
out, because absolute success does not exist—"it is a verbal mirage."
What he seeks to escape is an absolute failure, what he
anxiously pursues is an absolute success—and they do not exist
outside his aching head. What he does in fact achieve is a
series of relative successes; and these are all that he, these
are all that anyone, can ever achieve.1
As we strive to go, from what can be referred to generally as
"failure," to something else which can be evaluated as "success," the crucial
point, according to Johnson, is "that one which we agree to recognize as the
point of transition—the point %t which we leave failure and enter success
j




Unless such a point can be recognized, we are denied the
experience of believing that ve have reached our destination,
that ve have achieved "success." And until we can believe
that we have achieved "success," we continue to assume that
we have not achieved it—we continue to experience "failure."
Under such circumstances we feel frustrated, and, eventually,
distraught.2
The non-Aristotelian investor recognizes that he cannot always be
right in his stock investments, lie hopes to be right more often than he is
wrong. But if he fails to cut his losses when he has made a wrong stock
selection and fails to let his profits ride when he has made a right stock
selection, he can be successful in terms of selecting more right stocks than
wrong and yet be a failure in terms of money lost. Tims, we can conclude
that, while it is desirable for an investor to have as his goal the selec-
tion of more right stocks than wrong stocks, for this gives a greater
probability of success, financial success does not necessarily follow from
stock selection success.
It thus appears that the failure-success transition point of Johnson,
when applied to the stock market, is that point where the investor is capable
of maintaining the purchasing power of his funds. If the investor cannot
maintain the purchasing power of his funds, he is a failure. If he main-
tains or betters the purchasing power of his funds, he is a success. It is
not sufficient to measure success in terms of numbers of dollars, as -as
veil illustrated by Frank Vanderlip:
Ibid
. , pp. lf-5.
3Bdwards and Magee, pp. 420-421; Livermore, pp. 11-13; and Loeb,
PP. 103-108; 118-119; and 123.
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[Vanderlip] shoved that if an investor had placed $1,000
in a savings hank in 1900 and had alloved it to accumulate
at ccarqpouad interest, he vould have had $2,000 in 1920. How-
ever according to Mr. Vanderlip* s calculations, the investor
vould have had to add from his pocket another $1,000 in order
to buy exactly as many goods as he could have purchased dur-
ing 1900 with the original $1,000 deposit. 1*
To vhich may he added Loeb's comment concerning the difficulty in maintain-
ing purchasing power:
. . • should some super-solvent agency agree to preserve
the buying power of capital for a substantial length of time
at a stated fee per annum, informed people vould embrace the
plan enthusiastically if they felt there was any real possi-
bility of the agency staying solvent. 5
The Obstacle to Stock Market Riches
Most books written on the subject of the stock market offer the
reader a list of principles or rules, or advance a plan or a theory on how
6
to invest. Since none of these are particularly difficult to understand,
then why the paucity of investors who have become wealthy due to their stock
market activities? Perhaps some plausible reasons why all stock investors
are not wealthy are contained in this statement by Kama:
Success in the stock market requires knowledge and ex-
perience and both of these come slowly. When once acquired
and combined with certain requisite personal characteristics,-
they open the way to material increases in income and wealth.
'
k
Frank A. Vanderlip, Saturday Evening Post , January, 1933> quoted
from Loeb, p. 19.
Oioeb, p. 19.
"Examples, by no means all-inclusive, include: Angas, pp. 5-6;
Baruch, p. 25k; Bellemore, pp. 393-^10; Clendenin, pp. 662-663; Dice and
Enteman, pp. kik-k^; Dowrie and Fuller, pp. 587-589; Kama, pp. 65-89;




Kamm made three points in his statement:
1. The investor must possess knowledge.
2. The investor must have experience.
3. The preceding two must be combined with
certain requisite personal characteristics.
It is the writer's thesis that the primary reason why there are so few
wealthy stock market investors is that, while the first two of Kama's re*
quirements for success can he acquired, the third cannot. We may assume
that intelligence and knowledge can be acquired; that even a small amount
of capital, stock market experience can be acquired; but as for the third
point,
. . . makjTig money in the market demands a lot of "genius"
or "flair.'1 Ho amount of study or practice can make one suc-
cessful in the handling of capital if one really is not cut out
for it.8
To which should be added the following statement by Humphrey Neill:
Money-making is a mental characteristic. It is my personal
belief that it is an exceedingly difficult art to acquire; that,
indeed, one is born with it. You have an acquisitive nature
(I believe), or you haven* t .... Education has little or
nothing to do with the money-making characteristic.
9
Is the flair of Loeb or Meill's premise of the existence of a
"money-mind'1 so alien to our way of thinking? This is doubted, for a "• . .
key value in our culture is the belief that each individual is endowed with
certain unique gifts, talents, and potentialities ..."
Loeb, p. Ik.
q
Humphrey B. Neill, The Art of Contrary Thinking (Caldwell, Idaho:
The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1956), p. 105.
u
0. A. Chmann, "Search for a Managerial Philosophy," Harvard
Business Review, September-October, 1957* P» ^7«

7^
Overstreet, in propc^nading his maturity concept, stated that one
"insight of modern psychology is the idea of individual uniqueness." If
an investor does not possess the unique characteristic of what has teen
termed a "money-inind, " and is, consequently, unsuccessful on the stock
market,
... he may "blame himself for the low level of his accom-
plishment or his persistent discontent; hut not all his self-
berating, nor even all his efforts to become more competent by
further training, can make up for the original aptitude-lack.11
Conclusion
Any way one looks at it, nothing is more difficult than
succeeding in Wall Street, yet nothing is attempted by such
poorly equipped people or is considered as easy.12
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